OpenSSH 10.6 lists ML-KEM-768 and X25519 hybrid as its preferred SSH key exchange
The OpenSSH man page puts mlkem768x25519-sha256 ahead of sntrup761x25519-sha512 and curve25519-sha256; RSA remains a separate question of signatures.

OpenSSH 10.6 negotiates session keys with a hybrid of ML-KEM-768 and X25519, according to shattered.io, which cites the OpenSSH manual pages. The pages list mlkem768x25519-sha256 as the preferred key exchange, ahead of the older sntrup761x25519-sha512 hybrid and ahead of classic curve25519-sha256 shattered.io
shattered.ioshattered.ioOpen source ↗. RSA takes no part in this exchange.
Key exchange and signatures
ML-KEM and X25519 agree on a shared secret, while RSA proves identity with signatures, so inside SSH these algorithms do not compete for the same job. The author notes that confusing the roles leads to poor migration plans, such as regenerating every RSA key when the exposure lies in the key exchange. The recommendation is to run the hybrid wherever both ends support it, keep curve25519-sha256 as a compatibility fallback, and treat RSA as an authentication question with its own deadlines.
The priority on key exchange follows from the harvest now, decrypt later scenario: an adversary stores ciphertext today and waits for a quantum computer able to break elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman. The source stresses that this is a forecast, and none of the sources used claims that such a machine exists today. A forged signature helps an attacker only at the moment of authentication, so recorded traffic gains nothing from it. That is why OpenSSH shipped post-quantum key exchange first and treats post-quantum signatures as a second phase.
How the hybrid works
In the name mlkem768x25519-sha256, mlkem768 identifies the ML-KEM-768 parameter set, x25519 the Diffie-Hellman function on Curve25519, and sha256 the hash that merges the two secrets. The client sends key material for both algorithms in its first message, the server answers with its own contribution, and both ends derive one session key shattered.io
shattered.ioshattered.ioOpen source ↗. An attacker must break both X25519 and ML-KEM-768 to recover it. SSH has no pure ML-KEM mode in its default list.
The earlier sntrup761x25519-sha512 hybrid, which combines NTRU Prime with X25519, remains available directly behind the ML-KEM hybrid. Peers that lack ML-KEM can still negotiate it.
Negotiation does not fail loudly when a peer lacks the hybrid: the sides walk down the list until they find a common algorithm, which can hide a downgrade. The WarnWeakCrypto option writes a warning whenever the negotiated exchange is not post-quantum safe, without blocking the connection. According to the source, OpenSSH 10.6 enabled the corresponding functionality on the server, so a connection that settles on classic Curve25519 now produces a visible warning.



