Milan researchers: conspiracy mentality is not always central to belief networks in 29,938 respondents

Researchers at the University of Milan (Università degli Studi di Milano) led by Arturo Bertero analysed data from three studies with 29,938 respondents in 17 country samples. The work was published in the European Journal of Social Psychology. The team tested whether general conspiracy mentality, a tendency to suspect conspiracies behind events, and belief in specific conspiracy theories are distinct constructs, and which of the two holds the more central position in statistical networks wiley.comEuropean Journal of Social Psychologywiley.comOpen source ↗.

Many conspiracy narratives concern unrelated events, yet agreement with them often occurs together. A common explanation is that conspiracy mentality is the shared factor linking them. The alternative is that specific beliefs are connected to one another without a single common factor accounting for those links.

Method and samples

The authors used psychological network analysis, in which questionnaire statements are shown as nodes and their remaining statistical associations as links. The samples came from Germany, the USA and several other European and non-European countries. They were assembled online by quotas and were not random samples. Study 1 compared eight mostly cross-national conspiracy claims with five statements on general conspiracy mentality. Studies 2 and 3 used beliefs especially widespread in the USA or typical for individual countries, together with other measurement scales.

Results depend on measurement

In Study 1, in seven of eight countries the summary score for conspiracy mentality was less strongly tied to the network than each individual conspiracy claim. In France the statistical test was inconclusive. The belief-centred account was supported in France and was not falsified in any country under the preset criteria wiley.comEuropean Journal of Social Psychologywiley.comOpen source ↗.

Study 2 used data from 2,020 people in the USA and six widely known US conspiracy narratives. A general mentality score was relatively central in that network, but neither this account nor the opposite one met the strict criteria for clear confirmation. In Study 3, with 7,867 respondents from eight countries, the mentality-centred account was falsified in six countries and the belief-centred account in all eight.

Across the three studies, mentality and specific beliefs could mostly be told apart as two related constructs. Their distinctness does not mean that mentality is the origin of individual beliefs. The data speak against its holding the same central position in every belief network.

The results do not show which view arises first, because each person was surveyed at only one time point and network links do not establish cause and effect. The three studies also differed in respondent groups, countries and instruments, so the source of the divergent results cannot be isolated. The authors conclude that it matters which general attitudes and which specific narratives are measured wiley.comEuropean Journal of Social Psychologywiley.comOpen source ↗.